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Abstract : This paper discusses the 2005 dispute between the European
Community (EC) and the United States (US) regarding the customs classiﬁcation
of two speciﬁc products and the ambit of Art. X GATT (Publication and
Administration of Trade Regulations). The Dispute Settlement Panel and the
Appellate Body (AB) essentially upheld the position advocated by the EC, with
one exception that is of no practical import, as the EC had already modiﬁed its
regime. While the AB followed prior case law, it added two new ﬁndings. First,
the WTO-consistency of laws can be challenged under Art. X GATT if they
concern the implementation or application of laws concerning customs
administration and enforcement. Second, the obligation included in Art. X.3(b)
GATT to establish tribunals or procedures to review and correct administrative
actions relating to customs matters concerns courts of ﬁrst instance only. Thus it
is quite possible that their decisions might not be uniform, and absence of
uniformity at this level is not a violation of Art. X.3(b).
1. Introduction
On 21 September 2004, the United States (US) requested consultations with the
European Communities (EC) concerning its administration of laws and regu-
lations pertaining to the classiﬁcation and valuation of products for customs
purposes. In a nutshell, the dispute revolved around diﬀerences in tariﬀ classiﬁ-
cation across EC member states of identical products, in particular blackout
drapery lining and LCD ﬂat monitors with a digital video interface, and a lack
of uniformity of EC tribunals and procedures in the review and correction of
* We are grateful to Bill Davey, David Palmeter, Joost Pauwelyn, Tom Prusa, Frieder Roessler, Joel
Trachtman, Edwin Vermulst, and Joseph Weiler for sharing their views on this case with us, and com-
menting on a previous draft. The views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the World
Bank.
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administrative action on customs matters. The Panel Report was circulated in June
2006, the Appellate Body (AB) report in November 2006.1 The Panel found that
the speciﬁc EC tariﬀ classiﬁcation measures ran afoul of Art. X.3 GATT, but the
US government was less successful in challenging the behaviour of EC adminis-
trative courts entrusted with the enforcement of matters falling under the purview
of Art. X GATT. In particular, the Panel disagreed with the US government’s claim
that all agencies should be bound by the decisions of the ﬁrst-instance courts
covered by Art. X.3(b) GATT.
This is one of the rare WTO disputes that concern the interpretation of Art. X
GATT.2 As indicated by its title, Art. X deals with the publication and adminis-
tration of trade regulations.3 Art. X comprises a general transparency obligation
(X.1 GATT) with respect to all laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and adminis-
trative rulings of general application aﬀecting trade, requiring that these be
published. It also imposes speciﬁc obligations on governments to administer in a
uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner all laws, regulations, decisions, and
rulings pertaining to trade (including customs classiﬁcation) (Art. X.3(a)) and to
maintain or institute judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals or procedures
through which the administration of customs laws and related matters can be
reviewed (Art. X.3(b)). The provisions of Art. X.3 GATT formed the subject of
this dispute.
In this paper, we discuss four dimensions of the case. Two of these are of more
general character : the scope of Art. X.3(a) and the role of domestic courts under
Art. X.3(b) ; two are speciﬁc, relating to tariﬀ classiﬁcation:
1. The United States appeals a Panel ﬁnding that the scope of Art. X.3(a) GATT is
such that it cannot entertain any claims that go beyond issues regarding the
application of laws and regulations. In line with this understanding, the Panel
refused to ﬁnd, as the United States had requested, that the EC was in violation of
its obligation under Art. X.3(a) GATT in light of the divergent penalty provisions
and audit procedures that were in force in various EC member states.
2. The US appeals a Panel ﬁnding that Art. X.3(b) GATT does not require that
decisions of the judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals, or procedures for
the review and correction of administrative action relating to customs matters,
must govern the practice of all the agencies entrusted with administrative en-
forcement throughout the territory of a particular WTO Member.
3. The EC appeals a Panel ﬁnding that divergent classiﬁcation decisions of blackout
drapery lining by, on the one hand, German authorities and, on the other, the
customsauthorities inBelgium, Ireland, theNetherlands, and theUnitedKingdom,
1 European Communities – Selected Customs Matters, DS315 (WTO, 2006a, b).
2 It is the invocation of Art. X that makes this case distinct, as there is already a long history of disputes
under the WTO between the EC and the US on tariﬀ classiﬁcation and related customs matters, starting
with the 1996 LAN Equipment case (WT/DS/62).
3 Article X GATT is reproduced in the Annex to this paper.
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imply non-uniform administration of laws and thus constitute a violation of Art.
X.3(a) GATT.
4. The EC appeals a similar ﬁnding by the Panel that divergent tariﬀ classiﬁcation of
LCD ﬂat monitors results in a non-uniform administration of laws and thus a
violation of Art. X.3(a) GATT.
The next section of this paper presents the response of the AB to each of these
appeals. This is followed by a critical evaluation of the AB report and a discussion
of the (limited) economic dimensions of this case and the reasoning of the AB.
2. The AB’s response to the appeals
The AB rejected all but one of the four claims [item (3) above]. In doing so, it
conﬁrmed, albeit with modiﬁed reasoning, the Panel’s ﬁndings.
2.1 The scope of Art. X.3(a) GATT
2.1.1 The claim and the legal framework
Art. X.3(a) GATT requires that WTO Members administer all laws, regulations,
rulings, and decisions of the kind described in Art. X.1 GATT in a uniform, im-
partial and reasonable manner. The coverage of Art. X.1 GATT extends to laws,
regulations, decisions, or rulings of general application. The question before the
AB was whether the Panel had erred in ﬁnding that the observed divergence across
diﬀerent EC member states in penalty provisions and audit procedures did not run
afoul of Art. X.3(a) GATT.
2.1.2 The AB’s response
To respond to this question, the AB had to ﬁrst satisfy itself that the challenged
penalty provisions and audit procedures are laws, regulations, decisions, or rulings
in the sense of Art. X.3(a) GATT. With respect to penalty provisions, there is no
common EC law that is applicable throughout the EU. The EC lawyers testiﬁed
before the AB that, in the absence of EC competence to this eﬀect, member states
are free to set the level of penalties, and that they are bound only by common
principles that oblige them to ensure that penalties will be eﬀective, proportionate,
and dissuasive. Conversely, with respect to audit procedures, there is an EC stat-
ute, the Community Customs Audit Guide, that binds all member states but leaves
some discretion to the customs authorities of the member states entrusted with its
application (·208, AB Report).
The AB held the view that both the member-state statutes regarding penalty
provisions, as well as the Community Customs Audit Guide, fall under the pur-
view of Art. X.3(a) GATT. In so doing, it distanced itself from the Panel’s analysis
in this context. The AB relied, as did the Panel, on prior case law, according to
which Art. X.3(a) GATT deals only with the administration of laws and not with
their substantive conformity with the GATT. For example, a WTO Member that
believes a law coming under the purview of Art. X.3(a) GATT is discriminatory
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should invoke Art. I GATT, and not Art. X.3(a). In the AB’s view, however, this
does not mean that laws regulating the administration of speciﬁc legal instruments
do not come under the purview of Art. X.3(a) GATT. The AB therefore makes a
distinction between legal instruments regulating a speciﬁc customs transaction and
legal instruments regulating the manner in which such legal instruments operate
(when applied to speciﬁc customs transactions). In the words of the AB (·200,
WTO, 2006b):
While the substantive content of the legal instrument being administered is not
challengeable under Article X:3(a), we see no reason why a legal instrument
that regulates the application or implementation of that instrument cannot be
examined under Article X:3(a), if it is alleged to lead to a lack of uniform, im-
partial, or reasonable administration of the legal instrument.
Thus the AB held the view that both the statutes concerning penalty provisions,
as well as the Community Customs Audit Guide, were instruments regulating the
application and implementation of speciﬁc instruments and, consequently, came
under the purview of Art. X.3(a) GATT.
Having established the applicability of Art. X.3(a) GATT, the AB turned to
whether the US had established a violation of Art. X.3(a) GATT. It held that this
was not the case. In its view, the plaintiﬀ should have provided evidence con-
cerning the degree of diﬀerence in the level of the penalty provisions that were
imposed, including evidence on the impact of such diﬀerences. The US did not do
this, relying instead on a sentence in an EC Commission document (‘An explana-
tory introduction to the modernized Customs Code’) stating that speciﬁc oﬀences
may be considered a serious criminal act in one member state, whereas they may
lead to a small or even to no penalty in another. In the AB’s view, such diﬀerences
need not be a reﬂection of penalty provisions; they might stem from the exercise of
discretion in the application of law (·213,WTO, 2006b). Hence, the AB concluded
that the US did not satisfy its burden of proof, since it did not establish that the
mere existence of diﬀerences in penalty provisions, in and of themselves, led to
non-uniform administration of EC customs laws.4
The AB reached a similar conclusion with respect to audit procedures. The US
pointed to a provision in the Community Customs Code (Art. 78.2), which em-
powers customs authorities to conduct audits but does not oblige them to do so.
In the AB’s view, uncertainty as to when and if an audit will be carried out is in the
interest of sound customs administration. As a result, the AB concluded that the
US had failed to show why diﬀerences in audit procedures necessarily led to a
demonstration of non-uniform administration (·216, WTO, 2006b). Given the
absence of concrete examples, the US did not meet its burden of proof and, as a
result, its claim was rejected.
4 The US legal strategy could be summarized as a mix of broad legal challenges on the consistency of
EC legal instruments with the GATT, coupled with speciﬁc challenges regarding individual products.
34 BERNARD M. HOEKMAN AND PETROS C. MAVRO ID I S
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745608004242
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 19:36:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
2.2 The role of domestic courts under Art. X.3b GATT
2.2.1 The claim and the legal framework
The US appeals a Panel ﬁnding that WTO Members need not, by virtue of
the obligation included in Art. X.3(b) GATT, establish courts that will have the
authority to bind all agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement
throughout the territory of a WTO Member. In the Panel’s view, the courts re-
ferred to in this provision are ﬁrst-instance courts. As such, it is reasonable that, in
some national jurisdictions, they might have been assigned a speciﬁc territorial
scope.
The US appeals this ﬁnding using predominantly textual arguments. In its view,
the Panel did not pay attention to the term agencies appearing in Art. X.3(b)
GATT, which, unless understood to cover all administrative agencies throughout
the territory of one WTO Member, cannot guarantee uniform application of laws
as required by this provision.
2.2.2 The AB’s response
The AB dismisses the US argument in only one paragraph (·297, WTO, 2006b),
essentially reproducing the Panel’s analysis. It then opts for overkill with a number
of paragraphs that do not add anything substantial to the original ﬁnding. In a
nutshell, Art. X GATT is an obligation imposed on preexisting regulatory diver-
sity. It covers courts of ﬁrst instance. In many WTO Members, courts of ﬁrst
instance have a deﬁned territorial scope. Thus, it is normal that their decisions bind
only those agencies operating within their territorial scope. Uniformity will be
achieved, if at all, at a higher judicial level (since such decisions can be appealed).
2.3 The tariﬀ classiﬁcation of blackout drapery lining
2.3.1 The claim and the legal framework
The Panel’s ﬁnding concerning the tariﬀ classiﬁcation of blackout drapery lining
(BDL) was predicated on a prior ﬁnding that the administrative process ultimately
leading to the tariﬀ classiﬁcation comes under the purview of the term administer
in Art. X.3(a) GATT. What was objectionable in the Panel’s view was not the
outcome itself (the tariﬀ classiﬁcation), but the process that could lead to GATT-
inconsistent outcomes.
The process was as follows: the German customs authorities relied, for the
purposes of tariﬀ classiﬁcation of BDL, on an Interpretative Aid particular to the
German authorities. They also did not rely on decisions of other EC customs
authorities regarding the tariﬀ classiﬁcation of BDL. This practice could lead to
non-uniform application of customs laws and thus run afoul of Art. X.3(a) GATT
(·230, WTO, 2006b). However, this was not the outcome in this speciﬁc case
(·231). Consequently, what the Panel actually condemned was the potential for
violation and not an observed violation of Art. X.3(a) GATT.
The EC appealed this ﬁnding on three counts : (i) the decision concerned an
expired measure (·232, WTO, 2006b); (ii) there was no explicit reference in the
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decision of the German customs authorities to the Interpretative Aid that had
allegedly been used (·233); and (iii) the Panel ignored a letter by the German
customs authorities (Hamburg Main Customs Oﬃce) to the eﬀect that it did take
into account the practice and decisions of other EC customs authorities (·233).
2.3.2 The AB’s response
The AB overturned the Panel’s ﬁnding. To do this, it ﬁrst established that the
administrative process leading to an outcome does indeed come under the purview
of Art. X.3(a) GATT (·227, WTO, 2006b). It then applied a diﬀerent standard of
review than that used by the Panel : for a violation of Art. X.3(a) GATT to occur in
the eyes of the AB, the Panel should have shown that the diﬀerential administrative
process necessarily leads to non-uniform administration of customs laws. Absent
such a demonstration, no violation of Art. X.3(a) GATT can be established
(··238–9). The Panel did not do this. Indeed, the Panel could not have done so,
since, as explained above, the outcome (tariﬀ classiﬁcation) actually was uniform
across the EC member states (·242).
The EC had further submitted a claim that the Panel, for the reasons mentioned
in its appeal, violated its duty under Art. 11 DSU to undertake an objective as-
sessment. The AB did not entertain this claim, deciding that it was not necessary to
do so for the purposes of resolving this dispute (·243).
2.4 The tariﬀ classiﬁcation of LCD ﬂat monitors
2.4.1 The claim and the legal framework
With respect to the tariﬀ classiﬁcation of LCD ﬂat monitors with a digital video
interface (hereinafter LCD), the situation was as follows: video monitors are
classiﬁed under tariﬀ heading 8528 and pay a 14% import duty in the EC market,
whereas computer monitors are classiﬁed under tariﬀ heading 8471 and pay 0%
import duty. The Netherlands classiﬁes LCD under 8528, whereas other EC
member states do so under 8471. As a result, there is discrepancy as to the import
duty that LCD exported to the EC market are subjected to, depending whether
the destination is the Netherlands or another EC member state. The Panel had
originally found that this discrepancy amounted to non-uniform application and,
consequently, violated Art. X.3(a) GATT.
The EC appeals this ﬁnding. The EC does not contest that divergence indeed
existed across the various member states. It argues, however, that it has taken
action since 2004 to address this phenomenon (·246, WTO, 2006b). The EC
submits that the adoption of EC Reg. 2171/2005, combined with the withdrawal
of the Dutch measure (classifying LCD under 8528), are two measures that amply
demonstrate that it did address the discrepancy. The Panel had refused to take such
evidence into account because it was submitted belatedly, that is, after the interim
review stage. The EC believes that the Panel’s handling of this evidence was DSU
inconsistent, since the evidence submitted related directly to the interim report that
had been circulated to the parties to the dispute (·248). Moreover, the EC asserted
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that the Panel violated its duty under Art. 11 DSU to make an objective assess-
ment, since it took into account actions (the classiﬁcation of LCD by the Dutch
authorities) that post-dated its establishment (·249).
2.4.2 The AB’s response
The AB was confronted with two questions:
(a) Can the Panel rely on evidence that post-dates its establishment?
(b) Was the Panel’s decision not to take into account the evidence submitted by the
EC at the interim review stage correct?
The AB answered the ﬁrst question aﬃrmatively. In its view, the Panel could
legitimately rely on data that post-dates its establishment in order to understand
how a measure that was in place when the Panel was established was being ad-
ministered. The AB found support for this conclusion in the fact that the EC did
not point to any evidence predating the Panel’s establishment that could contradict
the evidence on which the Panel relied (·254, WTO, 2006b).
The AB responded aﬃrmatively to the second question as well. In prior case law,
the AB had established that evidence submitted for the ﬁrst time at the interim
review stage is legitimately ignored (·259).
In light of its responses, the AB unsurprisingly rejected the EC claim that the AB
had violated its duty under Art. 11 DSU. Moreover, the Panel did discuss the draft
(at the interim review stage) regulation that would address the discrepancy ob-
served with respect to the classiﬁcation of LCD. It might not have paid it the
attention that the EC would have wished, but this is not a reason, as per prior case
law, to ﬁnd that the Panel violated its obligations under Art. 11 DSU (·258).
3. A critical evaluation of the AB response
3.1 The scope of Art. X.3(a) GATT
It is hard to disagree with the AB regarding the scope of Art. X.3(a). The US did
not even invoke the much-troubled mandatory/discretionary legislation case law
on this question. It relied on just one sentence to support its claim that adminis-
tration of laws by the authorities of EC member states is not uniform. As the
US did not challenge a particular measure, but instead focused on the overall EC
regulatory framework, it should have shown why this framework necessarily
leads to violations. Exercise of discretion might or might not lead to violation;
discretionary action must be judged by its outcome. The US, in other words, failed
the appropriate standard of review.
The AB’s reasoning can also be supported on economic grounds – the eﬀects of
non-uniformity are what matters. That said, from an economic perspective it is not
clear why an importing government would permit non-uniformity in the ﬁrst
place. Assuming a unitary state and taking as given the objectives of the central
government, external trade policies should be enforced uniformly at the border,
independent of the speciﬁc frontier crossing used by a trader. Presumably, the
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government has strong incentives to enforce the application of its trade policies in
a uniform manner, as otherwise there will be loss of revenue (if the good is subject
to tariﬀs) or non-achievement of the underlying objective (e.g., public health or
safety).
As far as exporters/traders are concerned, two possibilities arise in any situation
of de facto non-uniformity in the application of external trade regulations. One
possibility is that the divergence implies lower trade costs in some location(s) : for
given transport and handling costs, traders may be able to beneﬁt from diﬀerential
application of trade regulations by shipping the product to the entry point that
oﬀers lower overall regulatory costs. In the case at hand (diﬀerential classiﬁcation
of an identical product at diﬀerent entry points), traders would have a strong
incentive to use the port/entry point where the applied trade regulation (e.g.,
classiﬁcation) results in the lowest (tariﬀ) burden. In this case it is not clear that
traders (exporters) have an incentive to invoke Art. X – they are potentially better
oﬀ as a result of non-uniformity, and at worst will be unaﬀected. But the main
point is that it is not clear why a government would allow this situation to arise in
the ﬁrst place.
The second possibility is that the diﬀerential application of trade regulations
results in some entry points/customs authorities imposing higher trade costs than
what is intended by the government or permitted by the WTO – e.g., exceeding the
tariﬀ binding for a product or otherwise violating a WTO commitment.
Presumably if this occurs there will again be an arbitrage incentive and products
will be diverted to the lower-cost entry points. Of course, this will entail trans-
actions costs. If these are high enough, it may be worthwhile to deal with the
matter by bringing a case arguing that the importer is violating its tariﬀ binding or
other WTO disciplines. If so, one would not expect invocation of Art X – there are
better (more direct) remedies available.
In practice, the type of non-uniformity that was of concern to the US is more
likely to be speciﬁc to federal states and to customs unions. In the latter – the case
at hand – member states may well have incentives to diverge from the common
external trade policy. Their ability to do so will depend on the strength of the
union, as reﬂected in the extent of delegation of powers to cooperative/joint in-
stitutions and their ability to enforce their competencies. In the case of the EU – the
most far-reaching ‘serious’ customs union extant (and, indeed, much more than a
customs union) – there is clearly a presumption that member states will apply the
agreed common external trade policy. In practice, for a variety of reasons they may
not end up doing so, but the Commission (and the majority of members) presum-
ably has strong incentives to ensure uniformity in the application of the jointly
agreed trade policy (as otherwise members can compete by oﬀering lower customs
duties to attract traﬃc through their ports, and, more generally, unwind the overall
bargain that was struck in deciding the structure of the common external tariﬀ).
In the case that is the subject of this paper, the Commission acted even before the
Panel had reached a ﬁnding, suggesting that the incentives of the EU and the US
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were very much aligned: both want to see uniformity in the application of trade
regulations.
This reasoning applies to both of the hypothetical situations discussed in the
previous paragraphs as well as to a situation where the concern relates to the
uncertainty created as the result of non-uniformity, i.e. where application of a
policy varies across time and locations. If there are ﬁxed costs of switching (e.g.,
location-speciﬁc investments have been made in a port of entry) or the transport
and transactions costs associated with using alternative ports are high, traders can
be negatively aﬀected by non-uniform application of trade regulations. Insofar as
there is not a clear policy intent reﬂected in the stable application of a given
measure, invoking a provision such as Art. X may be the only practical recourse
available to an exporter. Note that the incentives of the exporters and the
government (in this case the Commission) are still aligned.5
An obvious question – to which we have no compelling answer – is why the US
did not invoke Art. XXIV:8, which requires that substantially the same duties and
other regulations of commerce be applied by each member of a customs union, or
Art. XXIV:12, which calls upon each WTO Member to take such reasonable
measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of the
GATT by the regional and local governments and authorities within its territory.6
If the US truly perceived the matters that were raised in this case as constituting
diﬀerential application of trade regulations, then these are the WTO provisions
that would appear to address the problem directly. Aside from the standard
hypothesis of the ‘glass house’ syndrome – worries about precedent-setting and
possible ‘retaliation’ – it is diﬃcult to understand why these provisions were not
invoked.
3.2 The role of domestic courts under Art. X.3(b) GATT
Regarding the review of administration of trade regulations, it is also diﬃcult to
disagree with the AB. It is quite evident from the text of Art. X.3(b) that it applies
to ﬁrst-instance courts. The purpose of Art. X.3(b) is to guarantee that actions
by agencies entrusted with enforcement of customs laws will be scrutinized by
domestic review bodies. The quest for uniform application of laws – that is, the
5 An Art. X case may also be the only recourse if the underlying reason for non-uniform application of
a policy is corruption and rent-seeking behaviour by parts of the government. Although clearly not an
issue in the case at hand, this type of situation is worth mentioning for completeness. In principle, if
government oﬃcials are corrupt, their behaviour will result in non-uniformity of application of trade
policy, and the incentives of the government and exporters/trading partners will no longer be aligned.
6 Erskine (2006) asks the same question. He argues that the diﬀerence in language between Art.
XXIV.8(a)(ii) and Art. X.3 GATT is an issue and proposes that the discrepancy be eliminated through
legislative action. He also recommends that the EC and the US sign an agreement to harmonize tariﬀ
classiﬁcation so as to avoid similar disputes in the future. It is unclear why the latter proposal would
address the issues arising in this case. However, in general, a move by a country to a uniform tariﬀ
structure will make tariﬀ classiﬁcation issues a thing of the past, as well as generate a variety of other
beneﬁts – see Tarr (2002).
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overarching objective – does not end with such courts. Appeals may be launched
against decisions taken, and it is only at this stage that a higher degree of uni-
formity should be requested. Even then, some heterogeneity might still persist and
be permitted.7 It is not unheard of, for example, that diﬀerent courts of appeal
might vary in their view of a particular transaction. The US, the appellant in this
case, should be quite familiar with this concept: its various federal courts do not
see eye to eye on all matters. Appropriately, the Panel and the AB both opted for
relative uniformity, not absolute identity.
There are some important contextual arguments that the AB could have
used that would help cement this approach: Art. XXIV:12 GATT introduces a
reasonableness test, according to which central governments should do what is
within their constitutional powers in order to secure an outcome at a lower level
of government. In this vein, federal states might be obliged to tolerate some
divergence by state courts in the context of Art. X.3(b) GATT.
3.3 The claims regarding tariﬀ classiﬁcation
There is nothing much to say about BDL. There are, however, three legal questions
that can be raised regarding the AB determinations on the classiﬁcation of LCD:
1. Recall that the EC claimed that the Panel had no evidence before it to ﬁnd that
the LCD classiﬁcation was GATT-inconsistent, and that it relied on evidence that
post-dated its establishment. The AB did not agree with the EC, holding that the
evidence before the Panel was enough. The evidence before the Panel, however,
was quite shaky: it consisted of two EC regulations that had been amended
before the Panel ﬁnished its work, an opinion of the Customs Code Committee,
oﬃcial notices by two national customs authorities, and letters from EC oﬃcials.
The ﬁrst two documents had been superseded by the time the Panel issued its
ﬁndings. It is rather odd that the AB found that the other documents constituted
suﬃcient evidence: had it applied the same standard throughout the claims
presented in this dispute, it would have probably found that the EC misclassiﬁed
BDL as well. After all, it is the same AB which held that some divergence is not, in
and of itself, grounds for ﬁnding that Art. X.3(a) GATT has been violated. Why
is some divergence in BDL diﬀerent from some divergence in LCD? Crucially,
the Panel does not explain anywhere what in the LCD practice necessarily leads
to non-uniform application, the criterion the AB established when dealing with
the claim regarding the classiﬁcation of BDL.
2. Moreover, the EC appealed the Panel’s ﬁnding on the basis that the Panel did not
take into account submitted evidence (the new regulation). The AB responded
that the Panel did take this into account; the fact that it did so without according
it the weight that the EC thought was appropriate was not, in and of itself,
adequate reason for the AB to ﬁnd that the Panel had not observed its duty under
Art. 11 DSU.
7 The literature on the GATT, with some minor variations, is unanimous on this; see, for example,
Hudec (1990), Jackson (1969), or Matsushita et al. (2006).
40 BERNARD M. HOEKMAN AND PETROS C. MAVRO ID I S
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745608004242
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 19:36:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
This is a weak argument for rejecting the appeal. In the Panel Report, the
evidence submitted by the EC is described as follows:
The Panel notes the existence of a draft Regulation concerning the classiﬁ-
cation of LCD monitors contained in Exhibit EC-163. However, at the
time the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties, the Panel had not
been provided with evidence to indicate that that draft regulation had the
eﬀect of removing divergence in tariﬀ classiﬁcation of such monitors which
became evident in 2004. (·7.305, footnote 580, WTO 2006a).
What evidence was the Panel looking for? The EC presented the new regu-
lation, which was enacted, as its preamble and text make clear, in order to amend
the previous legislation in place. The Panel discusses none of the features of the
new legislation at all. It makes an unsubstantiated assertion, and the AB takes the
view that it suﬃces that the Panel mentioned that it had in its possession the new
evidence. On this standard of review, there are dozens of Panel ﬁndings that
never should have been overturned.
3. Finally, the EC argued that the Panel relied on evidence that post-dated its es-
tablishment. The AB sees nothing wrong with that, and adds that the EC did not
submit any evidence to the contrary. This is probably awkward drafting by the
AB; otherwise it is quite unintelligible, since the AB imposes a remarkable shift in
the allocation of burden of proof: it is not for the EC to show that it is a good
citizen; it is for the US to show that the EC is bad citizen. Probably what the AB
had in mind was that the EC did not submit any information that would
counteract what both the Panel and the AB considered prima facie evidence
(discussed under (a) supra) that the EC had violated its obligations under Art.
X.3(a) GATT.
The economics here are identical to those discussed regarding the non-
uniformity of application of trade regulations – i.e., from an economic perspective,
there is no diﬀerence between the issues (incentives) that are created by diﬀerences
in classiﬁcation across states in a customs union and non-uniform application of
trade laws within a customs union.
4. Concluding remarks
The overall ﬁnding by the AB in this case is rather innocuous in terms of its
implications for the EC, since the EC amended its laws before the Panel had
completed its work (even though the Panel saw no evidence that this was indeed
the case). We also observe nothing dramatic in this jurisprudence. The AB reﬁned
somewhat the scope of both Arts. X.3(a) and X.3(b) GATT: we now know that
the WTO-consistency of laws can be challenged under Art. X GATT if the
implementation or application of these laws concern customs administration and
enforcement. We also know that the courts envisaged in Art. X.3(b) GATT are
ﬁrst-instance courts, and therefore their determinations might not be uniform and
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do not necessarily bind all agencies throughout the territory of the WTO Member
in which they are located. Absence of uniformity at the level of ﬁrst-instance courts
is not a violation of Art. X.3(b). The rest is an echo of prior case law.
It is quite surprising that the US did not invoke the mandatory-legislation case
law. Its problems notwithstanding, this provides the only conceptual framework to
discuss the consistency of a general measure as opposed to speciﬁc applications
thereof. It is perhaps less surprising that the US did not invoke Art. XXIV GATT.
Although in principle it appears to be directly applicable – as what was at issue
was the diﬀerential application of the common external trade policy of a customs
union, which would violate Art. XXIV:8 – the US may not have wanted to invoke
Art. XXIV for fear of setting a precedent that would induce subsequent challenges
to the WTO-consistency of its many free-trade agreements.8
Whatever the reasons for the (non-)invocation of Art. XXIV, it would be diﬃ-
cult to make a compelling case that the EC was intentionally applying diﬀerential
tariﬀs. This may help to explain why Art. X was invoked (i.e., putting the emphasis
on the eﬀectiveness of the processes within the EU to address instances of non-
uniformity). What does seem clear is that, in this speciﬁc dispute, the incentives
confronting the EC Commission were very much aligned with the US – i.e., both
favouring uniformity in the application of trade regulations – raising a more gen-
eral question regarding the political economy forces that led to this case being
brought by the US government in the ﬁrst place. It would appear that, given the
incentive structure confronting the Commission, simply bringing the matter to the
attention of the EC would have suﬃced – as in fact it appears to have done.
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Annex
Art. X GATT
Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations
1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general appli-
cation, made eﬀective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classiﬁcation or
the valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other
charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or
on the transfer of payments therefor, or aﬀecting their sale, distribution, trans-
portation, insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or
other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments
and traders to become acquainted with them. Agreements aﬀecting international
trade policy which are in force between the government or a governmental
agency of any contracting party and the government or governmental agency of
any other contracting party shall also be published. The provisions of this para-
graph shall not require any contracting party to disclose conﬁdential information
which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public
interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particular en-
terprises, public or private.
2. No measure of general application taken by any contracting party eﬀecting an
advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established and
uniform practice, or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restric-
tion or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments therefor, shall be
enforced before such measure has been oﬃcially published.
3. (a) Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reason-
able manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind de-
scribed in paragraph 1 of this Article.
(b) Each contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable,
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose,
inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative action re-
lating to customs matters. Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent
of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement and their decisions
shall be implemented by, and shall govern the practice of, such agencies
unless an appeal is lodged with a court or tribunal of superior jurisdiction
within the time prescribed for appeals to be lodged by importers ; Provided
that the central administration of such agency may take steps to obtain a
review of the matter in another proceeding if there is good cause to believe
that the decision is inconsistent with established principles of law or the
actual facts.
(c) The provisions of subparagraph (b) of this paragraph shall not require
the elimination or substitution of procedures in force in the territory of
a contracting party on the date of this Agreement which in fact provide
for an objective and impartial review of administrative action even
though such procedures are not fully or formally independent of the
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agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement. Any contracting party
employing such procedures shall, upon request, furnish the CONTRACT-
ING PARTIES with full information thereon in order that they may deter-
mine whether such procedures conform to the requirements of this
subparagraph.
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